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Abstract—Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) is one of
the promising passive authentication approaches for improving
the security of the Internet of Things (IoT). However, with the
proliferation of low-power IoT devices, it becomes imperative
to improve the identification accuracy at low SNR scenarios. To
address this problem, this paper proposes a general Denoising Au-
toEncoder (DAE)-based model for deep learning RFF techniques.
Besides, a partially stacking method is designed to appropriately
combine the semi-steady and steady-state RFFs of ZigBee devices.
The proposed Partially Stacking-based Convolutional DAE (PSC-
DAE) aims at reconstructing a high-SNR signal as well as device
identification. Experimental results demonstrate that compared
to Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), PSCDAE can improve
the identification accuracy by 14% to 23.5% at low SNRs (from
-10 dB to 5 dB) under Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
corrupted channels. Even at SNR = 10 dB, the identification
accuracy is as high as 97.5%.
Index Terms—RF fingerprinting, denoising autoencoder, par-
tially stacking, ZigBee.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the Internet of things (IoT) is becoming more
and more ubiquitous in our everyday lives. IoT integrates
physical devices into the core networks to allow them to com-
municate with each other and offer efficient services. However,
with the deployment of IoT networks, various security risks
have emerged as IoT devices can provide and/or have access to
private information. One of the profound security challenges
in IoT networks is identity authentication, which is the first
line of defense against intruders. Identity vulnerabilities in
the IoT networks contain these main facets as follows. First,
cryptographic keys or certificates cannot be efficiently dis-
tributed due to the limited computing power leading to weak
authentication [1]. Second, default keys or credentials can
be brute-forced by high-computing-power attackers, extracted
from device firmware or mobile apps, or intercepted at login
[2]. Third, the ID number such as MAC address in the header
needs extra spectral or power resources, which is limited
in IoT applications, to be transmitted [3]. Hence, a passive
authentication mechanism without cryptographic materials or
IDs may be the future of IoT identity authentication.
Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) is a promising pas-
sive authentication technique to identify transmitters by ex-
tracting device-specific features/fingerprints from Radio Fre-
quency (RF) signals. RFF is the inherent attribute of the
device’s hardware variability in the RF frontend [4]. It is
unique for each transmitter and is arduous to impersonate.
A lot of research has been executed in this area since the
1990s. Traditional RFF methods can be grouped into transient
approaches and steady-state approaches based on their target
signal region. More recently, some studies have embraced
Deep Learning (DL) for RFF identification. These existing
DL RFF techniques all belong to steady-state approaches. In
these approaches, minimal preprocessing is carried out on
the down-converted baseband signals and then sent to Neural
Networks (NNs) for feature extraction and classification [5].
Nevertheless, depending on the input type of NN, DL RFF
techniques can be further categorized into Time-series-based
DL RFFs (TDL RFFs) and Image-based DL RFFs (IDL RFFs).
TDL RFFs always adopt baseband In-phase/Quadrature
(I/Q) samples, which are concatenated in one channel or sep-
arate in I/Q channels, as the network input. In [6], MultiLayer
Perceptron (MLP) and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
were applied to each symbol alone to discern 22 LoRa devices.
Subsequently, Merchant et al. input the time-domain complex
baseband error signal to a CNN to identify seven ZigBee
devices against primary user emulation attacks in cognitive
radio networks [7]. Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) was
also used to learn higher-order correlations between the signal
samples to identify USRPs [8]. In [4], a multi-sampling CNN
was proposed to extract multi-scale features from the well-
synchronized preambles for discerning 54 ZigBee devices.
In IDL RFFs, time series are further transformed to images
based on various techniques before feeding into networks. To
name only a few, Recurrence Plot (RP), Continuous Wavelet
Transform (CWT), Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT),
and Hilbert Transform (HT) have been employed to generate
images. After transforming, these images were sent to a deep
network such as CNN, Deep Neural Network (DNN), Deep
Residual Network (DRN), or Multi-Stage Training (MST) for
feature extraction and transmitter identification [9], [10], [11],
[12].
Although various DL RFFs have been demonstrated to
achieve excellent identification in high SNR regions, their
performance in low SNRs is far from satisfactory. For instance,
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at SNR = 10 dB, the classification accuracies were only
73.73% for seven ZigBee devices [7], 38% for 12 mobile
phones [9], 58% for seven USRPs [13], and 65% for five
simulated radio emitters [12], respectively. However, since
most of the IoT devices are battery-powered, the transmitting
power is relatively low, they usually need to work in low SNR
scenarios. Therefore, it has a practical significance to study DL
RFFs in low SNR scenarios.
To overcome these shortcomings, this paper proposes a gen-
eral DL model based on Denoising AutoEncoder (DAE) and a
dedicated partially stacking method for ZigBee devices. First,
we perform synchronization and compensation on the received
ZigBee baseband signals. Then the steady-state symbols in
the preamble are stacked and concatenated to the semi-steady
preamble symbols. Thereafter, we propose a Convolutional
Denoising AutoEncoder (CDAE)-based network to extract
fingerprints from these concatenated symbols for identifying
27 Ti CC2530 ZigBee devices.
The main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a universal DAE-based architecture for all
the DL RFF techniques to enhance their performance,
especially at low and medium SNRs. Our DAE-based
approach can be trained by jointly minimizing the re-
construction error and the classification loss.
• Inspired by stacking spread sequences to enhance SNR
[14], we partially stack the steady-state symbols in the
ZigBee preamble rather than stack all the preamble
symbols. Partially stacking and concatenation are efficient
for combining the semi-steady RFF and the steady-state
RFF.
• We further investigate the performance of our proposed
Partially Stacking-based CDAE (PSCDAE) approach by
selecting two convolutional layers as the encoder of
CDAE and a dense layer with Softmax as the classifier.
Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed PSC-
DAE outperforms the original CNN method under all
training scenarios. When identifying 27 ZigBee devices,
it achieves an accuracy of 97.5% even at SNR = 10 dB.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the novel DAE-based DL RFF approach. Section
III discusses the partially stacking method for ZigBee devices.
Section IV shows the performance evaluation of the proposed
scheme. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. RFF BASED ON DENOISING AUTOENCODERS
An AutoEncoder (AE) is a neural network designed to learn
high-level data representation by the encoder and reconstruct
the input from that representation by the decoder in an
unsupervised manner [15]. By introducing input corruption
such as masking noise, effective features relatively stable and
robust to the corruption can be extracted by DAE [16]. How-
ever, AE is generally used for pretraining and initialization
of classification networks. Here, we propose a novel DAE-
based DL RFF approach, in which the encoder, decoder, and
classifier are trained simultaneously, as shown in Fig. 1. It
is worth noting that a conventional DL RFF method only
Autoencoder
Classifier
Reconstruction
Error
Baseband Signal
Autoencoder
Classification
Loss
Signal  Label
Encoder
Decoder
Reconstructi
on
Error
Baseband Signal
AWGN Autoencoder
Baseband Signal
CorruptionDSSS_version2
CNN
Crossentrop
y
Signal Label
Stacking
Encoder
Baseband Signal
AWGN Autoencoder
Corruption
DSSS_version1
DSSS_Stacking CNN
Stacking Decoder
DNN
Reconstructi
on
Error
Crossentrop
y
Baseband Signal
Signal Label
Stacking
Crossentrop
y
Signal Label
Baseband Signal
AWGN
Corruption Stacking
Coded  Feature
DecoderEncoder
Min-Max
Normalization
Preprocessing
Min-Max
Normalization
Preprocessing
Corruption
Classifier
Reconstruction
Error
Baseband Signal
Classification
Loss
Signal  LabelCoded  Features
Decoder
Encoder
Min-Max
Normalization
Preprocessing
Min-Max
Normalization
Preprocessing
Corruption
Total
Loss
l1
l2
Fig. 1. Denoising AutoEncoder-based DL RFF architecture.
includes an encoder for feature extraction and a classifier for
identification without a decoder for reconstruction.
Assume the received baseband signal s in the training is
ideal, which means there is no external wireless channel. It
can be denoted as
s = RFF (x), (1)
where the mathematical function RFF (· ) represents the de-
vice fingerprint, and x is the transmitted data. Then we will
first corrupt the input s to simulate the channel influence as
s˜ = H(s), (2)
where H(· ) can be an Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) channel or a multipath channel. Thereafter, vari-
ous preprocessing approaches including synchronization, fre-
quency and phase offset compensation [17], and transforms
(CWT, STFT, HT, etc.) can be applied to the corrupted signal:
s′ = Pre(s˜), (3)
where Pre(· ) denotes the preprocessing. Its output s′ can be
either a time series or an image, thus our method fits for TDL
RFFs nd IDL RFFs. Additionally, a min-max normalization
is indispensable, since the output of the decoder introduced
later is always between 0 and 1. The minimum and maximum
values in each dimension of the preprocessed vector s′ in
the training dataset are used and saved for the min-max
normalization:
z =min max norm(s
′
)
=
s
′ −min(s′train)
max(s
′
train)−min(s′train)
, z ∈ [0, 1]d ,
(4)
where z is the normalized value of d dimensions.
Then the input z is mapped to a hidden representation h
written as
h = fθ(z), (5)
where fθ(· ) denotes the encoder network, and θ denotes the
network parameters. Since then, our framework splits into
two branches. One is for reconstruction and the other is for
classification.
In the reconstruction branch, a decoder fθ′ (· ) parameterized
by θ
′
is applied to reconstruct a z˜ from h:
z˜ = fθ′ (h), z˜ ∈ [0, 1]d . (6)
We expect z˜ to be as close as possible to zˆ, which is the
uncorrupted input through the same preprocessing and min-
max normalization, expressed as
zˆ = min max norm(Pre(s)). (7)
Each i-th training input z(i) is mapped to a reconstruction z˜(i),
its reconstruction target is zˆ(i). The average reconstruction
error can be evaluated by the traditional Mean Squared Error
(MSE) as
MSE(z˜, zˆ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖ z˜(i) − zˆ(i) ‖2, (8)
where n is the number of training samples.
In the classification branch, the extracted features h are fed
into a classifier fθC (· ) parameterized by θC for prediction as
yˆ = fθC (h), (9)
where yˆ is the predicted probability distribution of all possible
labels. Then the classification loss can be measured by the
Categorical Cross Entropy (CCE):
CCE(yˆ,y) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
y(i)log(yˆ(i)), (10)
where y is the true label with one-hot encoding.
Parameters of this model are optimized by minimizing the
whole loss:
θ?, θ
′?, θ?C =arg min
θ,θ′ ,θC
λ1MSE(z˜, zˆ) + λ2CCE(yˆ,y),
(11)
where λ1 and λ2 represent the weight for reconstruction loss
and classification loss, respectively. This optimization will
typically be carried out by the stochastic gradient descent
algorithm and its variants.
III. PARTIALLY STACKING METHOD
A. Semi-steady and steady-state RFF
This paper aims to identify ZigBee devices for performance
evaluation. The ZigBee RF modulation format is Direct-
Sequence Spread-Spectrum (DSSS) Offset Quadrature Phase-
Shift Keying (OQPSK) with half-sine chip shaping. ZigBee
signals include an eight-symbol preamble of 0x0 for each
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Fig. 2. The in-phase ZigBee signals of eight preprocessed preamble symbols.
symbol. Accordingly, we will extract RFFs from these eight
preamble symbols to identify target devices.
In this paper, the preprocessing module in Fig. 1 is mainly
used for synchronization, which includes timing estimation,
frequency offset compensation, and phase offset compensation.
The details can be found in [4]. Then we observe each
preprocessed preamble symbol to study their difference. As an
example, the in-phase signals of eight preamble symbols for
one device are illustrated in Fig. 2. It is apparent that the semi-
steady portion (i.e., the first two symbols) is totally different
from the steady-state portion (i.e., the last six symbols). While
the last six symbols behave similarly. Also, the quadrature
channel and other devices exhibit similar behavior.
Thus, each preamble symbol-signal sk can be represented
as
sk = RFFk(x0), k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 8} , (12)
where x0 denotes the identical symbol 0x0 in the preamble,
and RFFk(·) denotes the RFF function on the k-th symbol.
Since s1 6= s2 6= s3 and s3 ≈ s4 ≈ · · · ≈ s8, it is self-evident
that:
RFF1(·) 6= RFF2(·) 6= RFF3(·), (13)
RFF3(·) ≈ RFF4(·) ≈ · · · ≈ RFF8(·). (14)
Therefore, if we study RFFs from the symbol scale, semi-
steady RFFs on the first two symbols are different from steady-
state RFFs on the following symbols in our target ZigBee
devices.
B. Partially Stacking
Xing et al. proposed that spread sequence in DSSS systems
can be stacked to enhance SNR for increasing identification
accuracy. However, in their simulation, RFF on each spread
sequence must be the same. Stacking is only available for
signal portions with invariable RFFs and constant data. There-
fore, stacking can be applied to the steady-state portion in the
preamble rather than the semi-steady portion. The partially
stacking process can be expressed as
[s1, s2,
1
6
8∑
i=3
si] =[RFF1(x0), RFF2(x0),
1
6
8∑
i=3
RFFi(x0)]
=[RFF1, RFF2, RFFs](x0)
=RFF (x0)
(15)
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Fig. 3. The in-phase channels of two partially stacked preambles for two
devices.
where RFFs is the steady-state fingerprint, RFF (·) is the
whole fingerprint consisted of the semi-steady fingerprint and
the steady-state fingerprint.
Partially stacking is the last step of preprocessing. After
partially stacking, two in-phase channels of two devices are
randomly selected and demonstrated in Fig. 3. It can be seen
that different devices have different RFFs, and the same device
has constant RFFs in different tests. It is also evident that the
RFFs in the first symbol differ the most, while the steady-state
RFFs in the generated last symbols by stacking are relatively
similar.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Experimental System and Data Collection
Our experimental system has 27 Ti CC2530 ZigBee devices
to be identified, a USRP N210 as the receiver, and a PC
with MATLAB and Tensorflow for processing. ZigBee devices
worked at their maximum power of 19 dBm, and they were
located within one meter away from the USRP, both for
enhancing the receiving SNR. In this way, the SNRs during
data collection were around 30 dB. These received signals can
be regarded as approximately ideal. Besides, owing to the 1
Mbps chip rate of CC2530, the sampling rate of USRP was
set to 10 Msps for ten-times oversampling.
In this paper, only AWGN channels were simulated as
the corruption module in Fig. 1. AWGN channels leading to
SNRs changing from -10 dB to 30 dB with step 5 dB were
all simulated. Hence, for each simulated SNR, the corrupted
input z of the encoder combined with its corresponding
reconstruction target zˆ and device label y constituted a sample
(z, zˆ,y).
We had 10,944 samples, roughly 405 ones for each device.
This dataset was randomly divided into 60% training data,
20% validation data, and 20% testing data. Five-fold cross-
validation was carried out during the performance evaluation.
The following networks were trained on the dataset including
all SNRs rather than a single SNR.
TABLE I
THE LAYERS AND ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED CDAE
MODEL.
Network Layer Dimension Activation
Input Input 1280 (or 480) × 2 -
Encoder
Convolution 128 × (10 × 1) ReLU
Max Pooling 4 (or 2) × 1 -
Convolution 128 × (3 × 2) ReLU
Max Pooling 4 (or 2) × 1 -
Decoder
Convolution 128 × (3 × 2) ReLU
UpSampling 4 (or 2) × 1 -
Convolution 128 × (10 × 1) ReLU
UpSampling 4 (or 2) × 1 -
Convolution 1 × (3 × 1) Sigmoid
Classifier
Flatten - -
Dense 1024 ReLU
Dropout (0.5) - -
Dense 27 Softmax
B. Model Structure and Parameters
Our proposed DAE-based method is a general method fit
for all the DL RFF approaches. Since CNN was mostly used
in the existing DL RFFs as stated in Section I, we chose
a CNN for performance comparison. It means the encoder
and the classifier constitute a CNN, thus a CDAE comprising
convolutional layers is used as the autoencoder. The structure
and parameters of our model are demonstrated in Table I. The
parameter selection is mainly according to our previous work
[4]. As described below, different input lengths are used for
comparison. When the input size is 1280×2 or 960×2, which
means eight or six symbols, the max pooling and upsampling
sizes are both 4×1. When the input size decreases to 480×2 or
320× 2, which means three or two symbols, the max pooling
and upsampling sizes both decline to 2×1. The reconstruction
loss weight λ1 and classification loss λ2 are set to 1 and
10, respectively. When λ1 = 0, our proposed CDAE model
degenerates into CNN.
All our network models were trained and tested running on
TensorFlow 1.12.0 with an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1050 Ti
GPU. The training was carried out by minimizing the whole
loss function in (11) using an Adam solver with a batch size of
64. In addition, dropout of 0.5 and L2 regularization of 0.001
on the dense layer were used to prevent overfitting. The initial
learning rate was set to 0.001. The training was repeated until
the validation accuracy didn’t improve within ten epochs. Then
the best validation parameters were stored for performance
evaluation.
C. CNN vs. CDAE and Semi-steady RFF vs. Steady-state RFF
As shown in Table II, we conducted experiments both
for CNNs and CDAEs using different signal portions as
inputs. Obviously, our proposed CDAE models achieve better
performance at all scenarios compared to CNNs. The main
performance improvement occurs in the region of [-5,10] dB.
Two-symbol semi-steady portions are fed into CNN 2 and
CDAE 2 to extract the semi-steady RFF. It can be seen that
TABLE II
THE IDENTIFICATION RATES USING DIFFERENT NETWORKS AND INPUTS.
SNR (dB) CNN 2 (%) CDAE 2 (%) CNN 6 (%) CDAE 6 (%) SCNN 6 (%) SCDAE 6 (%) CNN 8 (%) CDAE 8 (%)
-10 27.3 28.7 12.4 14.4 15.4 17.2 23.3 23.6
-5 50.7 52.0 24.8 26.9 31.0 35.9 43.5 47.3
0 63.4 66.1 32.5 34.0 33.5 42.7 52.6 58.3
5 81.9 84.3 48.1 53.6 49.2 58.3 77.3 82.0
10 90.7 91.4 74.8 80.4 72.1 81.1 90.7 94.6
15 94.6 95.5 90.9 91.7 83.5 93.0 96.8 98.2
20 96.8 97.1 94.5 94.9 87.3 96.7 98.1 99.4
25 96.4 96.2 96.5 97.2 90.3 98.2 97.4 99.6
30 96.9 97.7 97.4 98.4 92.6 98.5 98.0 99.8
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Fig. 4. Performance comparison of CDAE and CNN by combining semi-
steady and steady-state RFFs differently.
the semi-steady RFF performs the best at low SNRs from -10
dB to 5 dB compared to all other inputs. The semi-steady RFF
is relatively robust to AWGN channels.
The inputs of CNN 6 and CDAE 6 are six-symbol steady-
state portions. Compared to CNN 2 and CDAE 2, they only
behave better at very high SNRs, which means that the
steady-state RFF has more fine-grained features. However, by
stacking these six symbols, SCDAE 6 outperforms CDAE 6
at all SNRs, while SCNN 6 is worse than CNN 6 when
SNR is not lower than 0 dB. It can be seen that CDAE can
recover these fine-grained features from stacking as opposed
to CNN. Hence, only stacking with appropriate processing can
improve the identification rate. In a word, the semi-steady RFF
contributes more than the steady-state RFF in ZigBee device
identification.
Besides, we aim to evaluate the performance by using these
two RFFs simultaneously. Therefore, the whole preamble is
sent into CNN 8 and CAE 8 for identification, which has
been employed in [7]. In this way, the identification accuracy
improves at high SNRs (≥ 10dB), while its performance at
low SNRs is still a bit poor in contrast to using the semi-steady
RFF only.
D. Partially Stacking and Final Performance
Since stacking with CDAE (SCDAE 6) works better than
CDAE without stacking (CDAE 6), it is reasonable to imagine
that PSCDAE can further improve the identification accuracy.
The identification accuracies, precisions, recalls and their 95%
confidence intervals of PSCDAE and Partially Stacking-based
CNN (PSCNN) are manifested in Table III.
Besides, for easy comparison with SCDAE 2 and SC-
DAE 8 which behave the best in different SNR regions in
Table II, the classification accuracies of six approaches at
all SNRs are illustrated in Fig. 4. The dash lines represent
CNN-based methods, and the solid lines represent CDAE-
based methods. Besides, lines with the same marker have the
same input. It is apparent that CDAE-based methods behave
better than corresponding CNN-based methods, especially at
SNRs from -5 dB to 10 dB. Furthermore, PSCDAE has the
best accuracy at almost all SNRs, which demonstrates that it
can combine semi-steady and steady-state RFFs effectively. It
is also noticeable that PSCDAE is a bit worse than CDAE 8
by 5h and 8h at 25 dB and 30 dB, respectively. This is
owing to the information loss during stacking. As stated in
(14), the steady-state RFFs in the six preamble symbols are
almost equal, but some different fine-grained features still
exist. These fine-grained features can be extracted by CDAE 8
at high SNRs for identification. While as SNR goes down,
these features will be gradually covered by noise.
By comparison with CNN 8 which is used in [7], PSCDAE
can respectively improve the identification accuracy by 15.4%,
19.9%, 23.5%, 14.0%, 6.8%, 2.1%, 1.6%, 1.7%, 1.0% at SNRs
from -10 dB to 30 dB with step 5 dB. Besides, according
to Table III, it is also crystal-clear that the 95% confidence
intervals for PSCDAE are almost only half of that for PSCNN.
This is to say, models trained by PSCDAE are more precise
than those trained by PSCNN. In other words, performance
fluctuations of PSCDAE are smaller. Furthermore, it can be
seen that the accuracy of PSCDAE first increases dramatically
and then slightly goes down, it reaches the top when SNR
is equal to 20 dB. This is because, at high SNRs, the gain
introduced by the autoencoder is gradually lost. Due to the
existing reconstruction loss in the optimization objective, those
fine-grained features that are useful for classification while
adverse to reconstruction cannot be learned by PSCDAE.
TABLE III
ACCURACIES, PRECISIONS, RECALLS AND THEIR 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR PARTIALLY STACKING-BASED CNN AND CDAE MODELS.
PSCNN PSCDAE
SNR (dB) Accuracy (%) Precision (%) Recall (%) Accuracy (%) Precision (%) Recall (%)
-10 36.3± 2.1 34.7± 3.0 34.7± 2.0 38.7±0.6 39.4± 0.5 37.0± 0.7
-5 59.4± 2.0 61.2± 2.2 59.0± 2.3 63.4±1.3 65.7± 1.3 63.0± 1.1
0 71.5± 1.9 72.1± 2.0 70.5± 2.3 76.1±1.8 78.0± 1.8 76.3± 2.0
5 86.3± 2.3 87.8± 2.1 85.8± 3.0 91.3±0.9 92.4± 1.0 91.2± 1.0
10 95.7± 1.9 96.5± 1.8 95.6± 2.6 97.5±0.5 97.9± 0.5 97.7± 0.5
15 97.0± 1.1 97.3± 0.8 96.4± 1.1 98.9±0.6 99.2± 0.4 99.0± 0.6
20 98.6± 0.9 98.8± 0.6 98.3± 1.0 99.7±0.3 99.7± 0.3 99.7± 0.3
25 98.7± 0.9 98.5± 0.6 98.0± 0.9 99.1±0.5 99.4± 0.4 99.3± 0.5
30 99.0± 0.9 98.7± 0.9 98.5± 1.1 99.0±0.5 99.3± 0.4 99.2± 0.4
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has demonstrated a universal DAE-based frame-
work for DL RFF approaches. A partially stacking technique
has also been proposed to leverage both the semi-steady and
steady-state RFFs efficiently for identifying ZigBee devices.
A two-layer CNN and the corresponding CDAE model have
been used to show the superiority of our proposed scheme.
We have conducted various experiments on our testbed which
includes a USRP as the receiver and 27 CC2530 nodes as
targets. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed
PSCDAE outperforms the traditional CNN in [7] by 14% to
23.5% at low SNRs (-10 dB to 5 dB) under AWGN channels
in terms of identification accuracy. At high SNRs, it can also
slightly improve performance. Besides, the models trained by
PSCDAE are much more robust than those trained by CNN.
In future work, we will focus on studying multipath channels
as the corruption module as well as using images derived from
transforms as the input.
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